Local democracy develops best when there is demand from below.© UNDP in Armenia

In the modern world, decentralization and strengthening of local governments are key mechanisms for bringing governance closer to the people, and ensuring the efficient delivery of public services. This is the case in Armenia as well, which has undergone three waves of local governance reform since independence in 1991.

The first occurred in 1995-1996 with the introduction of a new territorial administrative framework and the adoption of basic local governance legislation. The second wave started in 2002 with the adoption of new local governance legislation, and subsequently led to changes that were reflected in the 2005 constitutional reforms. The third wave can be linked to the adoption of Yerevan’s 2008 local governance legislation, which gave rise to corresponding changes in local governance laws in other municipalities [...]

Source: http://www.developmentandtransition.net/Article.35+M55f33724058.0.html

On 20 January 2012, the authorities approved a new strategy to attract foreign direct investments. This document can be regarded as a new invitation for foreign business with advanced technologies to take part in privatization in Belarus. The authorities hope that Western businesses would come despite the country’s poor human rights record of Belarus and their failure to release all their political prisoners.

Although Belarusian authorities welcome energy subsidies from Russia and participate in Russia-sponsored integration projects such as the Single Economic Space they are reluctant to invite big Russian business in. The pace of Belarusian privatization is slow – although many trade and service enterprises were privatized, medium and large industrial enterprises still remain in state hands.  [...]

Russian Businesses are Not Welcome

Lukashenka and the First Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Siamashka said repeatedly that Russian oligarchs wanted to buy tidbits of the Belarusian state property for a pittance. They do not want to take part in privatization on the basis of transparent schemes. As Lukashenka said: “They want to fish in troubled waters”. Besides, officials said repeatedly that Russia was not a source of advanced technologies. In Russia, they spend more electric energy and materials per unit of output than in Belarus.

Russian observers note that Belarusian official authorities will intend to prevent Russian companies from buying Belarusian enterprises as soon as privatization takes place in the country. It is worth mentioning that only one out of 38 privatized enterprises was sold to a Russian company in 2011. (It was a clothing manufacture with 40 employees in Vitsiebsk.)

The strategy adoption should not be regarded in the context of Belarus-China relations either. Thus, Siamashka reiterated that China proposed polluting technologies. Moreover, the Lukashenka’s regime treats China as a separate direction of its foreign policies. As a rule, the documents on cooperation with China are not directed to other stakeholders.

The strategy can be regarded as an invitation for the Western businesses to make money in Belarus in cooperation with Belarusian top-ranking officials. Broadening of privatization and economic liberalization in Belarus are primarily explained by the interests of high-ranking officials.

Preference for Belarusian and Western Businesses

The top-ranking officials and Belarusian businessmen have accumulated a considerable of funds. Lukashenka is no longer making statements about the income of owners of luxury villas in posh Minsk suburbs. Those people would like to see their money working more efficiently in Belarus. They are afraid of dealing with the Russian large-scale business with criminal pasts and prefer to invite law-abiding partners from the West.

A representative of “KAAS” concern management (Germany) delivered the following statement at Minsk Forum in November 2008: “The German business goes to the places, where it is possible to make profit. It is possible to run a successful business even in China.” Such remarks were actively hailed by the invited governmental officials. They nodded their approval and smiled.

The Belarusian governmental officials believe that the aggravation of political relations with the West will not become a barrier for Western business. The top governmental officials hope that Western businesses can come to Belarus, if they are proposed attractive conditions and personal guarantees (i.e., let’s make a profit together). Their thinking is that they would do business in Belarus just like they do it in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the increasingly authoritarian Russia. Only time will show whether their strategy will work.

Andrei Liakhovich

Andrei Liakhovich is a contributing author. He directs the Center for Political Education in Minsk.

Source: http://belarusdigest.com/story/new-privatisation-plans-belarusian-authorities-prefer-western-investors-russian-7801

This post is also available in: Ukrainian

What has to happen in order for Ukraine to start benefiting from the Association Agreement with the EU, and the associated Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), conclusion of negotiations on which were announced at the EU/Ukraine Summit on 19 December?

It is important to understand that the Association Agreement and the DCFTA will not take effect until several further steps have happened.  Until then, these agreements cannot give Ukraine the foundations for long-term reform and economic growth for which they are designed.  Some of the steps are technical; others are political.  To take them in turn:

(i) initialling the agreement.  This is a technical process which does not require a political decision.  Together with lawyers, translators and other experts going through the agreed texts to make sure that there is no scope for uncertainty or difference about what has been agreed, this process is likely to take a number of months.

(ii) The next stage is signing.  Before this can happen, a political decision of the European Council, representing the EU member states, is required.  Because the Council decision would be on signature of the whole package (ie the Association Agreement including the DCFTA), it would be what is known in EU jargon as a “mixed agreement”.  This means that the Council decision would need to be taken by unanimity: every single member state would have to agree.

(iii) Once the Association Agreement has been signed, it will need to beratified by 30 Parliaments: those of the current 27 member states; Ukraine; the European Parliament; and soon-to-be-member state Croatia.

The technical detail of how signature and ratification work is important because the EU and member states have expressed concern that the recent trials of opposition leaders inUkraine appear to be politically motivated and selective.  They have said explicitly, including during the EU-Ukraine Summit on 19 December, that unless opposition leaders jailed as the result of flawed trials are freed and permitted to participate in politics, it is unlikely that the Association Agreement will be signed or ratified – ie stages (ii) and (iii) above.

The mechanisms for signature and ratification mean that all the governments of the member states need to be satisfied before the Association Agreement can be signed; and all the parliaments of the member states, plus Croatia and the European Parliament, need to be satisfied before it can be ratified.  It therefore seems unlikely that either of these stages will happen while opposition leaders remain in prison and unable to participate in politics on the basis of flawed trials.

Thus, these important agreements, potentially the most powerful tool to help bring about Ukraine’s European integration, will not begin to work.

PS: I have seen suggestions in some quarters that even if it is not possible to sign or ratify the Association Agreement and DCFTA, some elements of the Agreement could be put into force provisionally.  In practice, this, too, looks unlikely.  I will blog about this shortly.

Photo © DR

Source: http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/leighturner/2012/02/10/eu-integration-and-ukraine-next-steps-2/

The EU (European Commission/DG Education and Culture) offers a large number of scholarships to university graduates coming from European Neighbourhood Policy countries for post-graduate studies at the College of Europe (Bruges or Natolin (Warsaw) campus) during the academic year 2012-2013.

These scholarships cover academic expenses, accommodation, meals and travel costs.

The countries concerned are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

Selection procedure:

1. Candidates are requested to visit the website of the College www.coleurope.eu and check the necessary information under ‘Postgraduate Programmes’ and ‘Admission’: admission requirements and language requirements.

2. Candidates have to register and apply online (Admission/apply online).

3. Candidates have to print the application form and send it by post to the Admissions Office of the College of Europe (address : Dijver 11, BE-8000 Brugge) with the requested documents (cf. explanatory note).
The deadline for submission of applications is 15 March 2012 (postal stamp counts).

4. After the deadline, all applications will be evaluated by the study departments at the College of Europe and a preselection will be made. Preselected candidates will be invited for a (telephone) interview with the Professors/assistants of the department(s) they have applied for. The final decisions on admission and scholarships will be taken after all interviews of the candidates from the ENP countries. Candidates will be contacted by e-mail.

Download the Flyer

(For other scholarship possibilities, please see Scholarships)

Source: http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=admisscholar_ENP